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A3S TRACT
This paper attempts to combine Che recent ideas on contes tability
with older ideas on monopolistic competition in order to analyze
theoretically a question of considerable interest to economic
historians: why does the quality of a good tend to deteriorate in
markets with many producers?

QUALITY IX CONTESTABLE MARKETS:
THEORETICAL MOTES ON A HISTORICAL PROBLEM
I. The theory of contestable markets has made notable inroads into
the traditional way of looking at markets with only a few producers
but its relationship to the theory of monopolistic competition has
been largely overlooked. This omission is due mainly to the assump-
tion of a homogeneous output in the contestable markets literature.
In this article I would like to explore the link between having a
multiplicity of producers and the quality of goods provided in the
2
market. We would like to believe that competition among producers
(which is not assumed to be perfect competition) suffices to produce
those qualities most desired by consumers. Historically, however,
complaints about the quality of goods supplied by contestable markets
have been legion as I shall illustrate by some examples in Section II.
Is the failure of quality to be maintained simply a reflection of the
diversity of consumer tastes or do we have a failure of market organi-
zation?
It is curious to note that Adam Smith appears to have supported
the office of the aulnager, or sealer of cloth, in England because one
would have assumed that Smith found competition to be a sufficient
guarantee of quality. After explicitly noting the desirability of
having a central authority certify the quality and goodness of coin,
Smith goes on to compare such actions with the office of the aulnage,
3
thereby giving his approval of the latter.
To prevent abuses, to facilitate exchanges, and
thereby to encourage all sorts of industry and com-
merce, it has been found necessary, in all coun-
tries that have made any considerable advances
towards Improvement, to affix a publick stamp upon
certain quantities of such particular metals, as
were in those countries commonly made use of to
purchase goods. Hence the origin of coined money,
and of those publick offices called mints; institu-
tions exactly of the same nature with those of the
aulnagers and stampmasters of woollen and linen
cloth. All of them are equally meant to ascertain,
by means of a publick stamp, the nuantity and uni-
form goodness of those different commodities when
brought to market.
If we follow through the Logic of one of the features of a contestable
market emphasized by Raumol then it will be seen that the Smithian
view is perhaps not so strange. Baumol emphasizes the fact that an
incumbent is always vulnerable to hit-and-run entry if he ever tries
to exert his potential monopoly power.
The crucial feature of a contestable market is its
vulnerability to hit-and-run entry. Even a very
transient profit opportunity need not be neglected
by a potential entrant, for he can go in, and,
before prices change, collect his gains and then
depart without cost, should the climate grow
hostile.
This proposition is certainly true as far as it goes but it can in
fact be taken much farther. If there are no sunk costs and entry is
free then who is to tell the incumbent from the entrant? Why is not
the entire industry composed of transients? And if the industry is
composed of a large number of transients, why should they care bout
how the consumers regard the quality of their product?
Section II considers the evidence for quality variations in a
number of instances—wool in England, linen in Ireland, silk in China
and milk in Bangladesh. Section III turns to the problems involved in
modelling such situations, presents a formal model and notes that a
multiplicity of producers appears to be no guarantee of a uniform
-3-
quality. Section IV provides some additional historical evidence and
concluding remarks.
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ll. In reading about the fortunes of the English cloth industry
one is struck by the continued repetition of complaints about quality.
This widespread belief led to the. passage of many laws whose intent
was to secure the unifornly good quality of woolen cloth, the primary
English export of the three centuries prior to the Industrial Revolu-
tion. In describing the structure of the woolen industry in the
seventeenth century, an economic historian comes close to describing
what is now called "contestability ."
Outside a few special trades, the individual
entrepreneur had a preponderance of his invest-
ment in the form of circulating captial and could
therefore withdraw from participation in his activ-
ity far more easily than his nineteenth-century
counterpart—much of whose capital was immobilized
in fixed items of investment... [A] sudden expan-
sion in output would be secured less by a change in
organization or techniques than by an increase in
employment and a multiplication of units of produc-
tion. Conversely, a fall in demand would quickly
put pressure on wages and employment. In these
circumstances, one marked feature of society .. .was
a considerable horizontal and even vertical mobil-
ity of capital, entreprenurial skill and labour.
It is curious to note that similar complaints arise in the case of
6
Irish linen in the nineteenth century.
Cloth production appears to be peculiarly prone to such problems
for we find the uneven quality of raw silk to be an issue in nine-
teenth century China. Mechanization demands a homogenous input and
American buyers repeatedly complained about the quality of silk being
sent to their plants. Self-interest alone should have dictated that a
reform of the Chinese silk industry take place. None did however and
the link between the multiplicity of small producers is noted by
7
modern commentators.
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The Chinese were never noted for a capacity to pro-
duce a lar^e supplies of any commodity to a uniform
quality, and in silk production, which necessarily
takes place in small units, the problem was espe-
cially troublesome.
Henry Accum created a considerable stir in 1820 with his Treatise
on Adulterations o'f Food in which he showed the widespread adultera-
tion of both foods and drugs in England. Accum was unable to obtain
any legislative help however and it was not until the 1870's that
samples were taken and analyzed, when it was found that, between 1876
and 1886, a minimum of 11.9 percent and a maximum of 19.2 percent of
Q
such articles were adulterated. The difficulty of verifying the
quality of foods without microscopes however makes this an unsatisfac-
tory example for my purposes. In order to separate out the affects of
consumer tastes and knowledge from those of industrial structure it is
necessary to find a commodity whose quality is readily ascertainable
by consumers and where some "objective" determination of the most
desirable quality can be arrived at.
Milk is an excellent commodity for such a purpose. Most consumers
are familiar with it and the purity, in terms of fat content, is
readily ascertainable by taste. It is curious that many countries
have difficulty in readily providing pure milk. In the Baltimore of
the 1920' s, when milk distribution was locally organized, pure milk
was something of a rarity. A student of the industry describes con-
9ditions as follows:
In the days before bottling plants and refrigerated
milk trucks, entry into the market was easy, and
hundreds of milk dealers and farmers fought for a
share in that market. In Baltimore, as in other
-6-
cities, fierce competition between the many sup-
pliers meant that cutting prices was more important
than improving milk quality.
Once again, the connection between a multiplicity of small producers
and quality will be noted.
In Bangladesh today, pure milk, is hard to find. Several hundred
peasants supply milk, to the capital city, Dhaka, from surrounding
villages. The only fixed capital, cows, are readily salable in an
active market. So entry and exit are both easy. And adulteration is
widespread. In 19 78 a local newspaper went so far as to publish pho-
tographs showing peasants from the villages stopping on the wayside in
order to adulterate their milk. Not only was the water added in
public but it was water from a local irrigation canal! A variant of
this situation is reported in India where rice is sold mixed with
pebbles. So great is the speculation in this line that small hawkers
can be found next to the large rice sellers whose only task is to pro-
vide them with pebbles! We need a model that will rationalize the
existence of impure equilibria in contestable markets with many
sellers.
lit. It was noted earlier that the curious feature about the
adulteration of milk is that the producer of diluted milk provides no
service that cannot be better provided by the consumer, and at zero
cost. If milk is best taken diluted, then why not dilute it at home
where one has control over both the quality and quantity of water to
be added? Why risk drinking canal water when the alternative is so
simply available? On the assumption that milk is adulterated solely
with clean water, an assumption least favorable to my thesis, the cost
function for milk of qulaity 8 is given by C(8) = 6. <' 8 < 1. Here
8=1 denotes a gallon of pure milk whose cost is normalized at unity.
Since the adulterant, water, is free, the cost of adulterated milk of
quality 8 is B, where 8 can also be read as the proportion of pure
milk in a gallon of "milk" supplied for sale. As every consumer can
be assumed to have access to water as clean as that available to the
dairy farmer, the only rational price a customer will pay for a gallon
of milk of quality 8 is 8, where the price of a gallon of pure milk is
set equal to its cost of unity. In order to see where the dif-
ficulties arise, let us look at the simplest model in which a producer
produces one, and only one, "gallon" of milk. The only choice
variable is quality. If p(8) denotes the price paid for a good of
quality 8 and C(8) the corresponding cost, the profit of the producer
is given by
TT = p(8) - C(8)
with first-order conditions for an interior maximum of
_o_
?! - =, -
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In order to ensure an interior equilibrium, we must have p < 0.
The shape of the demand curve for quality is thus of central impor-
tance in deciding the existence of an equilibrium. It was just argued
in the case of milk that the only "rational" shapes of such curves
would be convex or, at best, linear. How can the curves turn concave?
Something must be done to modify the dependence of pirce soley on
quality. The most natural modification is to assume that the demand
curve depends not only on the quality of milk actually offered for
sale, but also on the average quality available in the market. The
typical consumer is now supposed to react as follows to milk of 90
percent purity. "If 100% pure milk is readily available, I will not
touch this stuff. However, if I can expect to get only 85% pure milk
in the raaret this milk is worth almost a whole dollar to me." For
high levels of (average) market purity the demand curve will be convex
but for lower levels of purity the curve can now be concave. The
two features noted above, namely, (a) the dependence of price on
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average quality available and (b) Che concavity of the "demand" rela-
tion for some values of B, will be of crucial importance for the model
being developed.
The producers problem is now
max p( 9,v) - C( e)
where v is the average quality available.
The assumptions already made about the milk market enable us to be
a little more precise about profits. Once a gallon of milk is pro-
duced, all costs have been incurred. The actual choice of quality is
thus independent of production. If one decides to sell milk with 50
percent water then one has doubled the amount of milk for sale. For
this problem therefore the function to be maximized is revenue, or,
p(9,v)
., . • .
it = *
—
. Maximizing with respect to 8,
dir
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1 "
P
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-
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e
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The concavity of p(B,v) with respect to fl, a condition whose plausibil-
ity was argued earlier, is thus sufficient for an interior maximum.
If we make the "heroic" Chamberlinian assumption of "identical" cost
and demand conditions across firms then we will have industry
equilibrium with 9 = v, a condition to be explored below. Otherwise,
a diversity of milk duality will appear in the market. The conditions
of this problem, have been so chosen however as to suggest that a
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failure of some kind, either on the part of the consumer or that of
the producer, exists whenever impure tailk continues to be offered on
the market. Why would a consumer ever want to have his milk supply
adulterated by someone else?
To do comparative statics, differentiate (1) with respect to v to
get
P12
(i-e)de
.
dv "' p + p 11 (9-l)
The concavity of p(8,v) serves to make the denominator positive and so
the sign of the expression depends upon p, 9 .
d 9
Regardless of the sign of -
—
, there are two circumstances in which
dv
we can be sure that individual producer choices will immediately lead
to market equilibria.
(a) if p 1? = 0, then producers do not care what average quality is; as
a result, their choice will necessarily become the average.
d9
(b) if p 1 9 = C - p , so that-— = 1, always, then since 9 = v at
both the endpoints of and 1, 9 must equal v everywhere on the
unit interval.
In order to sign p._ let us consider the two simplest functional
forms that represent the dependence of p on 9 and v
a
A. p = a+6— +n9, 8,n>0
v
B. p = a' + P'(9 - v) Y + n'8, B',n' > 0, y 1, 2 or 3.
In A., p < and in B., p = for y = 1, p ]9 < for y = 2, and
p 17 ^ for y = 3 depending on whether 9 ^ v. The diagrams below plot
the various shapes for 9(v).
-11-
B. y - B. y = 3
In all cases, it will be seen that the slope of -^-necessitates that
dv
9(v) intersect the 45° line to provide us with a market equilibrium.
Furthermore, the same restrictions on the slopes imply that the
interior equilibrium will be unique. It will be seen that for an
individual producer to sell pure milk regardless of the quality bei
a?
sold in the market would require, as a necessary condition, that
p = 0, and that this is not the only plausible specification of
demand. The Appendix extends this model to the case where quantity
and quality can be chosen by the producer and it is shown that there
is still a presumption that impure equilibria will occur.
t
B. y =
In all cases, it will be seen that the slope of -— necessitates that
civ
9(v) intersect the 45° line to provide us with a market eauilibrium.
Furthermore, the same restrictions on the slopes imply that the
interior equilibrium will be unique. It will be seen that for an
individual producer to sell pure milk regardless of the quality being
sold in the market would require, as a necessary condition, that
p = 0, and that this is not the only plausible specification of
demand. The Appendix extends this model to the case where quantity
and quality can be chosen by the producer and it is shown that there
is still a presumption that impure equilibria will occur.
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IV. Libertarian readers have asked me how I could be sure Chat
the public did not really want diluted mi l'< . The suggestion has
moderate plausibility in some cases , but one can hardly believe that
consumers would not prefer to dilute the milk, themselves—this would
not only give them control over the extent of dilution but also ensure
that the water being added was clean. And how does one rationalize
14
all the pebbles in the rice along libertarian lines? Whatever the
consumer saves in buying a cheaper product he more than pays for
through a weakened constitution and higher medical bills.
Akerlof had concluded from his pioneering study that some mech-
anism was necessary to supplement the usual competitive framework in
order to avoid problems such as the non-existence of a market for used
cars. Geoffrey Heal (1976) suggested in a comment on Akerlof '
s
article that the problem was considerably mitigated if we assumed the
traders to deal repeatedly with each other, in which case the incen-
tive to "cheat" would be considerably diminished. Akerlof pointed out
in his reply that there was no institution in the market to ensure
that buyers and sellers would frequently meet each other; furthermore,
Heal's result was unstable in the sense that "bad" behavior on the
part of even one trader could lead everyone to revert to providing
lower quality products.
The commonest "solution" for quality deterioration is, of course,
to set minimum standards. Yet another is to make the seller liable
for the quality of his product, i.e., to replace the usual rule of
caveat emptor by caveat venditor . Hayne Leland (19 79) has considered
the former problem and concluded that minimum quality standards will
-13-
be mors advantageous, ceteris paribu s, under any of the following four
circumstances (a) greater sensitivity to quality variations, (b) low
elasticity of denand, (c) low marginal cost of providing quality, (d)
low value placed on low-quality service. Leland also concludes that
if a professional group is to set the minimal quality then there will
be a tendency to set this minimum higher than is socially optimal.
The solution proposed by Heal does not require continual govern-
ment (or professional) action once the appropriate institution is set
up while the proposal to have minimum quality standards obviously
requires monitoring. Unfortunately, as long as we continue with the
assumptions of monopolistic competition, requiring many small producers
and contestability , requiring easy entry and exit, it is hard to think
of any mechanism that will ensure repeated meetings of buyer and
seller at low cost.
The difficulties with government or professional regulation are
just as great if not greater. Not only is it possible for the quality
of individual producers to move in a direction opposite to that of the
average, the presumption that honest enforcement can be attained is a
questionable one. There is no good reason why actions which are pro-
fitable for private dairy farmers are not also profitable for state
owned dairy farms. The same system that permits quality deterioration
to occur in private firms will generally be powerless to prevent its
occurrence within a bureaucracy.
If the historical evidence is any guide, it will appear that
neither of the above approaches is quite feasible. Where quality
-14-
control has been effectively exercised, it has occurred by enlarging
the effective unit of production and by having a self-interested
party, the buyer, assume responsibility. The failure of attempts to
effectively regulate the quality of woolen cloth is well-known to eco-
nomic historians; nonetheless, it is true that the quality of worsted
cloth was effectively regulated in the late eighteenth century by the
Worsted Committee, an employers organization. Herbert Heaton comments
12
on the difference between the woolen and worsted industries —"in the
woolen a large number of small men, in the worsted a small number of
big Tien." (The cloth halls at Leeds provided almost 3,000 stalls for
the woolen industry and only 258 for the worsted.) Similarly, it is
noticeable that the Chinese with their dispersed production were
unable to provide quality silk while the Japanese succeeded in doing
so. Once again, the organization of the industry appears to be the
decisive factor. Larger units were prevalent in Japan than in China,
and the State was willing to give legal sanction to desirable
13
actions
.
Despite the achievements of the foreigners in
developing markets for Chinese silk and in modern-
ising the organization of methods of silk produc-
tion, the trade, as we have seen, failed in com-
petition with the Japanese. Some reasons for this
failure have already been given; but as the expla-
nation goes to the root of Chinese commercial
backwardness it may usefully be elaborated. The
silk trade, for its successful organization, needed
a high degree of centralisation at some points and
a wide dispersion at others. The production of
cocoons is necessarily a manual process and is
highly suited to snail-scale peasant agriculture.
If, however, large quantities of uniform silk are
to be provided—and uniformity is necessary for the
subsequent manipulation of the silk on knitting
-15-
franes or power looms—then there must be cen-
tralised supervision over certain processes. In
Japan this supervision was provided in two ways:
by the licensing of egg-producers as already
described, and by the establishment of close rela-
tions between groups of silk raisers and particular
filatures... Centralised control is again neces-
sary at the port through which the silk passes for
sale abroad, for at that point reliable testing and
conditioning arrangements raust be set up. These
conditions for the successful conduct of the silk
trade could not be satisfied ii. China. [emphasis
added]
The milk industry of countries like Denmark achieved a quality
product in the nineteenth century for two reasons: first, export
requirements made it desirable (the example of the Chinese silk
industry tells us that this alone is not enough); secondly, the dairy
industry was organized in cooperatives who also took charge of milk-
processing plants. In Baltimore the effective enforcement of laws
served to increase the capital requirements, restrict freedom of entry
(and exit!) and change the transient nature of many producers.
Indeed, it is not clear whether any of the large U.S. cities were pro-
vided with uniformly pure milk until large-scale production and
distribution took charge.
The question of quality is one that has been generally ignored by
economists for over 200 years. Prior to Adam Smith, it was an issue
of some prominence; after 17 76 however the emphasis became increasingly
one of competition as the guarantor of quality output. With the
exception of Charles Babbage, no economist appears to have considered
this a serious issue until Edward Chamberlin focussed upon a quite
different facet, product differentiation. The main thesis of this
paper is that quality has a definite tendency to deteriorate in
markets with many small producers and easy entry; the most effective
-16-
check to this deterioration is the increase of irrevocable fixed assets
While the conclusion seems Co bear a flag for big business it should
not appear so on a little reflection. When significant amounts of
money are invested the businessman tells us that he plans to stay for
some time to come. In the long run, the only way to stay is by
pleasing customers. This requires providing them with the goods they
really want and this long-term dependence of producers upon consumers
is perhaps the most effective guarantee of quality.
-17-
rootnotes
See 3aumol (1982) and Che references therein as well as Che sub-
sequent exchange with some critics (1983).
2
"While a variety of models exist dealing with quality none bear
directly on the problem at hand. Dixit (1979), Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
or Spence (1976) do not deal adequately with the nature of the
"different" commodities marketed. Lancaster (1975) and Leland (1977)
deal solely with questions of optimalit;*. Rosen's (1974) model is
similar to mine but the thrust of his analysis is different. The
spirit of Akerlof's (1970) paper is closest to my aims. However,
there is no uncertainty about quality in the model to be developed in
Section III.
3 Smith (1976) , 40.
4
Baumol (1982) , 4.
5 Supple (1959), 9.
6
A brief state of the debate concerning the sealing of brown linens ,
(Dublin: P. Wilson, 1763).
Allen and Donnithorne (1954), 62.
8 Stieb (1966) , 120.
9
Wessel (1984).
The change of the demand relation from convex to concave
suggests that the model has some curious dynamic properties, which I
intend to explore subsequently. As the focus of this paper is
entirely on comparative statics, I have not entered into issues of
dynamics
.
If we make the assumption that ir(9,v) is linear in 9 and con-
tinuous in v , it is possible to show that a Nash-Equilibrium involving
values of 9 equal to or 1 does exist. In view of the absence of any
institutional mechanism which will push us from an equilibria involving
< 9 < 1 to one where 9 = or 1, such a result must be a curiosity.
For a proof see S. Rashid, "Equilibrium Points of Nonatomic Games:
Asymptotic Results," Economic Letters .
12
Heaton (1920) , 297.
13
Allen and Donnithorne (1952), 68.
The research for this paper was begun with a Haney grant from Dartmouth
College and continued with a grant from the Bureau of Business and
Economic Research at the University of Illinois. Earlier versions
have been presented at Purdue University and the University of
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Illinois. I am grateful to Che participants at these seminars and
especially Co Jeremy Atack, Fred Gottheil, Larry Neil and Peter Schran
for their helpful comments. Special thanks are due Co Professor W. J.
Baumol for his comments.
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APPENDIX
The Appendix extends the model to the case where producers decide
both the optimal quality and quantity. The firm now maximizes
p(6, v, q)'q - C(9, q)
where a term involving quantity has now been included in both the
demand and the cost function. The first order conditions are
P
l
" C
l
= °*
Pl q + p
- C
2
= 0.
and the second-order conditions involves well-known restrictions on the
signs of bordered determinants.
In order to obtain comparative static results we look at the total
differentials of the first order conditions.
P ll q "
C
ll P13 q
+ Pl "
C
12 H "P12 q
P 31 q
+ Pl "
C
21 P 33 q
+ 2p
3
" C22 If " P32 q " P2
30 "P 12 q(p33 q
+ 2p
3
" C22 }
+ (p 23 q
+ p2
)(p 13 q
+ Pl "
C
12 }
3v
_3q.
" (p 23 q + P 2 )(p ll q '
C
ll
+ P12q(p 21 q
+ Pl "
C
21 }
3v P~]
where JJ j is the determinant of the matrix on the left-hand side, which
we know to be positive from the second-order conditions. The signs of
-A2-
—
— and
-r-* obviously cannot be determined without making specific
assumptions on the form of p( 9 , v, q) . If we continue with the exten-
sions of the forms used earlier
A' : p = a + fl- + n3 + Sq
v
3': p - a ? + 3'(9 - v) X + n'9 + 5q, where x = 1, 2 or 3
Then some simple calculation indicate that, for example,
3 9
for A', —- < if C ! 0; indeterminate otherwise
o v J. z *
-
-r-*" < if C,„ < 0; indeterminate otherwise
3v 12 —
<\ a
for B'
,
-r— < if Cn < 0; indeterminate otherwise
X=l
3q
-r-
2
- < if Cn '. 0; indeterminate otherwise
for B', ^ J if 3 S provided C \ 0.
-r* is generally indeterminate.
The disturbing feature of the analysis just performed is that there
are many cases when —— < seems a possibility, i.e., cases where indi-
vidual producers who had substandard products to start with try to
further worsen quality on hearing of a general improvement in quality.
The condition to be fulfilled is that C.„
_< 0. Fortunately, if we con-
sider the simplest sorts of food adulteration the "technology" will
normally imply that C. „ > 0, i.e., the marginal cost of production
increases at higher qualities. This is not very much comfort, however,
-A3-
because the si£n of -— now becomes merel/ indeterminate instead of
being definitely perverse. It will be noted that the existence of many
firms, some of whom deliver quality services and the others substandard
ones is even found in developed economies; a U.S. Government survey in
the Spring of 1979 claimed that one-half of all gas-stations were not
competent at repairing cars!
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